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ABSTRACT
An attempt has been made to demonstrate that Greek space is 
characterised by an inter sectoral, inter regional and intra-regional 
duality as well as by a highly disintegrated economic structure. The 
above evidence was used to contest the assumptions of the classical 
location theories of Weber, Isard, Christaller, Lösch and Alonso, who 
emphasised the existence of a homogeneous and balanced 
distribution of physical and human resources in space; and the 
assumptions of the theory of interregional flows of factor 
movements of Lutz and Richardson, who attributed to these flows 
virtuous effects in relation to inter regional imbalance.
A further conclusion drawn from the historical development of the 
Greek socio-economic spatial structure was that until 1922 there 
were no definite national boundaries. Consequently, the conven­
tional disequilibrium models of regional distribution of resources, 
which tend to abstract national space from the wider international 
context, would impede identification of the relation between what we 
have called transnational integration, national and regional 
disintegration of socio-economic structures in Greece. For such 
reasons it was claimed that the models of centre-periphery and 
dependency theories, suggested by Friedmann, Frank, Amin and 
Sunkel, would prove more relevant for analysing Greek socio­
economic space.
By employing these models, we have demonstrated that urban and 
regional polarisation in the modern Greek State was caused by a new 
system of authority-dependency relations which was grafted onto a 
pre-capitalist «traditional» system of society, and which radically 
transformed the spatial organization of the existing urban system. 
The new national élites, in close partnership with foreign capital, 
amassed a growing proportion of the nation’s wealth. Moreover, the 
new import-substitution industrialisation policies implemented by the 
élites contributed to the growing primacy of the Athens region, 
where processes of «circular and cumulative causation» sustained ac­
celerated growth. Thus, a vicious circle of cumulative disequilibrium 
was set in motion, which produced a type of urbanisaton without in­
dustrialisation with its concomitant phenomena of «involution» and 
«ruralisation».
The conclusions of our research pointed to a structural 
heterogeneity that suggests five different levels of technology, 
organization and social relationships within the major economic sec­
tors of Greece's socio-economic formation.
introduction
Unlike other Western European countries which by 
1870 had already entered their modern industrial stage, 
Greece joined the process of industrialisation only after 
becoming an independent State in 1832. Its progress 
towards a capitalist economy took a great step forward 
in the 1920s with the arrival of more than a million 
Greek refugees from Asia Minor,1 but showed concrete 
achievements only after World War II with the 
assistance of massive American aid in the 1950s.
Some of the basic features of contemporary Greek 
society were established while the country was under 
the rule of the Ottoman Empire. In the pages to follow, 
we shall elaborate on the Greek socio-economic struc­
ture in that period, attempt to trace the causes and 
origins of some of these basic features of underdevelop-
1. In 1922, after the Asia Minor defeat of the Greek army by 
Kemal Atattirk’s nationalist forces, which put a final and fatal end to 
Greek irredentism.
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ment, and explain why they have persisted in contem­
porary Greece.
Although regional imbalances, inequalities and struc­
tural, socio-economic weaknesses are experienced in 
many countries, they are most characteristic of the 
developing ones. Dual societies and economies exist 
mainly in Africa, Asia, Latin America and South Euro­
pean countries, where the process of development and 
modernisation was not gradual, and where the predomi­
nant influences are still core-periphery relations and 
patterns of dependency.2
A country’s relevant structures and institutions can 
only be defined through a close study of the historical 
process of their formation and transformation. To 
understand the present, it is necessary to review the for­
mative periods of the past and the heritage from times 
which have contributed significantly to the present 
shape of these societies.3
It is within this frame of reference that an attempt 
will be made here to show how the «Greek drama» 
evolved.4
Greek diaspora communities and cosmopolitan capital
For five centuries (1453-1922), the socio-economic 
space of Greece was scattered over the Mediterranean 
in Greek diaspora Communities as far apart as Livorno, 
Trieste, Vienna, Marseilles, Odessa, Constantinople, 
Smyrna and later Alexandria.
For the first two-hundred years (15th and 16th cen­
tury), the Greek provinces suffered depopulation and 
decline. In the south of the Balkan peninsula (Central 
Greece, the Peloponnese and the islands), the great ma­
jority of the population was ethnically Greek. The 
north (Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace) was made 
up of an ethnic mosaic: Greeks, Serbs, Slavs, Vlachs, 
Turks, Jews, Armenians. They were living together 
peacably and all subject to the rule and law of the 
Sultan. The economy was a backward type of 
agricultural production geared mainly to domestic con­
sumption.5
2. See Literature on dependency theory by Amin, Bianchi, Fur- 
tado, Girvan, Sunkel, Social and Economic Studies, Voi. 22, No. 1 
(March 1973).
3. See O. Sunkel, «Methodological Suggestions for the Study of the 
development of the Countries of the European Periphery», 
Background paper to the Workshop on the European Periphery, IDS, 
Nov. 24-26, 1977.
4. The term «Greek drama» is used here with the explicit intent to 
show the similarities between the Greek case and the «Asian drama» 
analysed by Myrdal in Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty oj 
Nations (Penguin Books, 1977).
5. See C. Tsoukalas, Dependence and Reproduction: The Social
Role of Educational Institutions in Greece 1830-1922, Themelio,
Athens, 1977.
The social organization reflected the predominant 
form of land ownership. There were two types of land 
holdings. In the fertile plains of Eastern Thessaly, Cen­
tral Greece, North Euboea, Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace, the land was not broken up and the large land 
holdings (chifliks) belonged to Turkish overlords who 
had Greek, Serb or Slav peasants as tenants to cultivate 
the soil. The peasants lived like serfs (koligos) in a closed 
economy and society, isolated from the rest of the 
world and from all economic monetary transactions. 
These regions did not develop any trade or handicraft 
activities, nor did they experience migratory move­
ments or population losses.6
The second type of land holdings was commonly 
found in the mountain regions of Epirus, the Pelopon­
nese, Western Thessaly (Pilion), and the islands, where 
each family owned and cultivated a small plot of land 
which was quite insufficient to meet the needs of the 
local population, and which was soon exposed to 
monetarised forms of economic relations and transac­
tions. It was there that the first kefalochoria developed 
a communal type of social organization. In order to 
cope with adverse economic conditions, these villages 
evolved a mixed open economy and became gradually 
oriented towards trade, handicraft and intercontinental 
transport and shipping which soon resulted in 
migratory flows and population movements.7
Both of these forms of society were to be found in the 
Greek regions of the Ottoman Empire, which were 
predominantly rural. The urban sector of the economy 
centred on Constantinople, where a substantial number 
of Greek craftsmen, tradesmen, Church and State of­
ficials (phanariotes) were working for the Ottoman 
court and army.
Since population statistics for the above period are 
both rare and unreliable, no quantitative data can be 
given and our presentation must remain descriptive.
The 17th and 18th centuries saw a change in the 
spatial distribution of population and economic ac­
tivities. The rapid development of the community-type 
villages in the mountain regions of the Balkan penin­
sula was based on export trade in domestic production 
of agricultural and handicraft products such as woven 
cloth, silk, woollen textiles, furs, wheat, sailing ships, 
and raw materials. A three-fold development simulta­
neously promoted domestic production, export trade 
towards the West, and a network of trade routes pass­
ing from the main trade centres and ports of Epirus and 
Macedonia through Albania and Serbia, to reach the 
main European centres at Vienna, Budapest, Trieste, 
Livorno etc. It was in those cities that the phenomenon
6. See C. Tsoukalas, «Greek Countryside-Land Property System 
and the Development of Social Classes», in op. cit., p p. 69-84.
7. Ibid., «Spatial Distribution of Migratory Movements», p p. 
112-123.
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of Greek travelling merchants emerged, who gradually 
founded settled Greek trading houses in the centres of 
Western and Central Europe.8
During the period 1650-1850, these first Greek 
diaspora communities in West and Central Europe— 
composed of merchants, bankers, financiers, and 
students (the first Greek bourgeois class)—were 
estimated to be around 1.5 million strong. This was cer­
tainly much more than the number of Greeks living in 
mainland Greece. (In this context, mainland is used to 
mean the Greek regions of the Peloponnese, Central 
Greece, Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, and in­
cludes the islands.) It was mainly from Epirus, 
Macedonia and Thrace that young Greek merchants 
emigrated to Europe to join the ranks of the diaspora 
Greeks in Vienna, Marseilles, London and Trieste.9
It was in this way that the first round of Greek mer- 
cantilistic capital accumulation started, containing also 
the germ of national proto-industrial capital accumula­
tion, since its activities promoted local crafts and small- 
scale manufacturing activities. But this was not able to 
withstand the competition from British industrial prod­
ucts when the latter began to make their appearance in 
the international market. At the turn of the 18th and 
early in the 19th century, this incipient Greek manufac­
turing was pushed out of business, and was obliged to 
change its spatial and structural orientation towards 
new markets and new activities.
The following Diagram shows how the Greek 
mainland regions were incorporated into the European 
capitalist system through the activities of Greek mer­
chants along the trade routes to Europe.
At the beginning of the 19th century, these com­
munities lost their importance and autonomy and 
became gradually absorbed into the European society 
of the receiving country. This was due to the changes in 
the structure of international trade and production, re­
quired by the tough competition of English industrial 
products, which dealt a fatal blow to the young Greek 
proto-manufacturers. From that time on, a spatial 
change in population movements shifted the Greek 
migratory flow towards the East. Young migrants now 
left the villages of the Peloponnese, Thessaly, Epirus, 
Western Macedonia and the islands, to migrate to the 
ports and towns of Roumania, Southern Russia, Asia 
Minor and, towards the end of the century, to Egypt.10
The Greek merchants now played the role of in­
termediaries, as promoters of English, French and Ger­
man industrial products in the periphery of the world 
system, i.e. in Turkey, Southern Russia and Egypt. The
8. Ibid, «The Development of Greek Diaspora Communities», p p. 
269-286.
9. Ibid., «Size and Orientation of the Waves of Rural Exodus», pp. 
108-109.
10. Ibid., pp. 269-186.
Western powers now needed to find new outlets for 
their industrial products in the Middle East markets, 
and the Greek merchant, who was competent in the 
work, was only too glad to play the part of middleman. 
The second round of Greek mercantilistic capital ac­
cumulation had set in, but it was never channelled into 
industrial capital accumulation.
It is estimated that there were about two million 
Greeks in Asia Minor at the beginning of the 20th cen­
tury, more than half of them belonging to the urban 
sector. Southern Russia in 1920 had 800,000 Greeks 
employed in rural occupations, most of whom were 
gradually assimilated into the local population. 
Roumania during the period 1820-1860 had 40,000 
Greeks, also to be gradually assimilated.11
Finally, in Egypt in the 1920s there were 200,000 
Greeks with urban occupations. They played the role of 
the pieds noirs in Africa and were instrumental in shap­
ing the economic life and destiny of the young Greek 
State.12
Together with the Asia Minor Greek bankers and en­
trepreneurs they became cosmopolitan and comprador 
capitalists par excellence orienting their operations and 
investment in the home country along the same pattern 
as they followed in Turkey and Egypt: the purchase of 
chiflik land, the promotion of shipping, the provision of 
loans to the Greek government at usurious interest 
rates, participating in the financing of public works, 
representation of foreign companies and interests in 
Greece, exporting agricultural and mining products to 
European markets and importing and promoting Euro­
pean industrial products in the Greek market.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the number of 
diaspora Greeks in the Middle East was greater than 
that of Greeks living in the young independent 
kingdom. It was they who were the main architects of a 
Greek State run by a large State administration chara­
cterised by clientelism and inefficiency, and possessing 
all the classical features of underdevelopment seen in 
most formations of peripheral capitalism. This meant 
that the State’s ability to pursue social goals was hinder­
ed by extensive clientelism; by Greece’s political and 
economic depedence on the Great powers who now clo­
sely controlled its internal politics and economic poli­
cies; and by the big diaspora and Greek cosmopolitan 
capital which had and still has an outward-looking 
orientation.13
A schematic structuralist analysis of Greece during 
the age of economic liberalism (1830-1922), when pre­
industrial Greece and its diaspora communities were
11. Ibid., pp. 287-301.
12. Ibid., pp. 287-301.
13. See N. Mouzelis, «1830-1880: Underdevelopment», in «The 
Development of Greek Capitalism: An Overall View», Greece- 
Facets of Underdevelopment, MacMillan, 1978.
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FIGURE I. Incorporation of Greek Regions into the European 
Capitalist System
17th-18th century Emergence of Greek proto-
Age of mercantilistic manufactures and diaspora
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FIGURE II. Incorporation of Middle East into the Peripheral 
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already in the periphery of the world economy, is given 
below.
post-industrial Greece in the periphery of 
the world economy (1922-1977)
The Period of Industrialisation, 1922-1950: The Model 
of Capitalist Dominance and Growing Marginalisation 
Phenomena
1922 was a fateful year in the history of modern 
Greece which saw the Greek army’s disastrous defeat 
by Kemal Atatiirk’s nationalist forces in Asia Minor. It 
spelled the final end to Greek irredentism and to the 
«Great Idea». In 1922, the pretty well final boundaries 
of the Greek State were established, and the more than 
a million Greek refugees who poured into the country 
as a result of the Asia Minor defeat were to have 
dramatic consequences for the Greek socio-economic 
structure. Inevitably, this sudden mass influx created 
severe disruptions in a population of only five million, 
and problems which required immediate solutions.14
Since not all of the refugees could be given land to 
settle, a great many of them remained in the large ur­
ban centres (especially in Thessaloniki, Komotini, 
Drama, Serres, Kavala, Volos, Xanthi, Heraklion, 
Mytilini and Chios apart from Athens and Piraeus)15 
and constituted a relatively skilled labour force at the 
disposal of Greek capital. Among those of them who 
came from the urban élite, many had occupied impor­
tant positions in the Asia Minor communities industry, 
trade and finance. With the savings they managed to 
bring they became much needed contributors to the in­
dustrialisation of the Greek economy, strarved of en­
trepreneurs and industrial capital. An enormous influx 
of foreign funds—government loans from abroad, 
private investments in public works, international aid 
for the refugees etc.—was soon to be added to this 
refugee capital. With it came increasing domination 
and control of the Greek economy by foreign 
interests.16
But despite all these changes Greece remained a 
predominantly agrarian country, though fear of social 
revolution due to mounting refugee pressure brought 
some hasty reforms. In 1923, the Venizelos govern­
ment decreed the expropriation of practically all large 
estates (public, private or Churchowned) and their 
distribution to landless peasants. The country’s very 
low ratio of arable land and the consequent rural over­
population meant the creation of extremely small
14. See N. Mouzelis, «1922-1960: Capitalist Dominance and 
underdevelopment», in op. cit.
15. See B. Kayser, «The Situation in 1928» in Human Geography 
of Greece, National Centre of Social Research, Athens, 1968, pp. 
31-34.
16. See N. Mouzelis, op.cit.
holdings utterly insufficient for adequate subsistence, 
and the widespread parcelling-out of the land only add­
ed to the peasantry’s economic plight. Some surplus 
population had been drained off by mass emigration to 
the United States, but on the Whole agrarian underem­
ployment was intensified and, by keeping the capital- 
labour ratio extremely low, contributed to perpetuating 
the very productivity of agriculture. Besides, no large 
agricultural production units existed to introduce more 
modern techniques.17
At this point in time, the capitalist mode of produc­
tion became dominant in Greece, even if this was not 
marked by any spectacular statistics. Even today, large 
capitalist enterprises in Greek industry employing wage 
labour to any large extent are very few compared to the 
myriad small family-based artisanal units. In any case, 
the industrial sector as a whole was less important until 
the late fifties than the agricultural or the tertiary sec­
tor, in terms of labour employed as well as in respect to 
its contribution to the GDP.18 Despite the rapid 
development of industry until the outbreak of World 
War II, heavy industry even now is notable for its 
absence.
Statistical data show the structure of the Greek 
economy in the inter-war period to have been as 
follows. In 1920, there were 2,213 industrial units 
which employed a total of 130,777 workers between 
them, but 1,188 of these units had only up to 5 
workers, 743 up to 25 workers, and a mere 282 more 
than 25 workers. In 1928, a mere 33% of the popula­
tion were salary or wage earners of any kind; 61% 
worked on their own account, and 6% were employers. 
In the same year, 68% still worked in primary produc­
tion, 15% in some form of industry, mines and 
transport, and the remaining 17% in trade, public and 
other services.19
Although the above economic structure had changed 
substantially by 1970, Greece—as we shall demonstrate 
in the next chapter—still exemplified most of the 
classical characteristics of distorted capitalist develop­
ment.
The inter-war period brought Greece several prob­
lems such as the relocation of uprooted peasants, 
disastrously bad harvests in the years 1929-1931, and a 
rapid drop in international demand for agricultural lux­
ury crops such as tobacco and currants which were 
Greece’s main exports. All these contributed to the in­
tensification of the agricultural difficulties and to a 
growing trade deficit.
In such conditions no rapid industrialisation was
17. See C. Tsoukalas, «The Creation of the Bourgeois State 
(1900-19221», in The Greek Tragedy, Penguin Books, 1969, pp. 
36-37.
18. N. Mouzelis,. op. cit.
19. C. Tsoukalas, op. cit.
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possible, and the Greek industry’s dependence on im­
ported capital goods further aggravated the un­
favourable trade balance. Private Greek capital went 
mainly into light industry, and even that only on a very 
small scale. This was to become one of the fundamental 
characteristics of the Greek economy after World War 
II. While enormous amounts of Greek-owned capital 
were profitably invested abroad, lack of capital at home 
and the reluctance of Greek entrepreneurs to invest in 
industrial activities obliged (and still obliges) Greece to 
depend on foreign capital and technology to fill the 
gap.20
The mechanisms which brought about such distorted 
capitalist development were vast State subsidies to big 
industry as well as outrageous credit facilities and a 
blanket tariff protection which made it possible for 
totally inefficient industrial companies to attain quasi- 
monopolistic positions despite their shortcomings. Fur­
thermore, indirect taxation penalised mostly small in­
comes and created further disruptions in an already 
heterogeneous social structure. The consequent ever­
growing inequalities and the marginalisation of small- 
commodity producers and farmers which accompanies 
the dominance of the capitalist mode of production in 
peripheral social formations became the chief features 
of Greece’s type of capital accumulation.21
These processes towards distorted capitalist develop­
ment confirm Quijano’s argument that
The historical process of transational integration and national 
disintegration in underdeveloped countries leads to a socio-economic 
structure whose character is that of dependency. Its main 
characteristic is that each of the new sectors of production and new 
formations which appear as hegemonic (leading modern sectors) at 
any moment of the process of capitalist expansion, are not the result 
of an organic development of those pre-existant sectors and forma­
tions in the underdeveloped countries’ socio-economic formation 
itself, but derive from the dominant formations of the overall system 
and are, therefore, grafted onto the previously existing production 
matrix.22
A schematic structural and spatial analysis of 
Greece’s transnational integration and national 
disintegration in the period between 1922 and 1955 is 
given below. Figure III shows the model of capitalist 
dominance and the growth of marginalisation 
phenomena in Greece. During this period, Greece’s 
economy was peripheral to the European core countries 
and only to a very minor extent to that of the United 
States.
20. Ibid.. «The Failure of Democracy (1922-1940)», op. cit. pp. 
46-47.
21. Mouzelis, in op. cit.
22. See Annibai Quijano Obregon, «The Marginal Pole of the
Economy...», in Economy and Society, Voi. 3, No. 3, Nov. 1974.
Features of Peripheral Capitalism and the Appearance 
of the Multinationals: The Post- War Period
A completely new phenomenon appeared after the 
end of World War II and conditioned much of Greece’s 
subsequent history. This was the economic, political, 
military and ideological influence of the United States 
on the country’s affairs, which replaced the formerly 
predominant presence and influence of Great Britain.
More recently, and particularly since 1974, Greece’s 
entrance as a full member into the EEC’s integrated 
economic system has become a main government con­
cern and a highly controversial political as well as 
economic issue.
Until the late fifties, and despite the fast growth of 
the economy and the capitalist mode of production 
having become dominant in industry, Greece still show­
ed many of the classical features of underdevelopment 
which characterise most peripheral capitalist forma­
tions: low-productivity agriculture, a swollen and 
parasitic service sector, and an industrial sector in­
capable of either absorbing unemployed agricultural 
labour (which consequently left for the United States, 
Australia or Germany) or of expanding into the produc­
tion of capital goods.
With respect to this last point, all the State’s develop­
ment efforts and investment incentives for the rapid in­
dustrialisation of the Greek economy could not per­
suade Greek capital to enter the key manufacturing sec­
tors of the economy, such as metallurgy and chemicals, 
the growth of which has such very far-reaching positive 
effects on the rest.23 These key sectors were left to 
foreign capital which, taking full advantage of the enor­
mous privileges granted it by the Greek State, now 
strongly invaded the dynamic key industries as well as 
other crucial sectors such as banking, insurance, con­
struction, engineering and trade.
The heterogeneity of Greece’s economic structure is 
very similar to the model developed in 1973 by Sunkel, 
who suggested four main categories in the economic 
structure of peripheral countries as interacting in the 
process of production and accumulation, each sector 
providing the others with inputs and outputs, and the 
whole process working to the advantage of the foreign 
sector and the detriment of the marginalised one.24
(1) The foreign sector: monopolistic level, hegemonic, 
leading dynamic firms, multinationals and foreign 
control.
(2) The public sector: State ownership or control.
(3) The national modern sector: intermediate com­
petitive level, national private companies, sector-led 
firms.
23. See N. Mouzelis, op. cit.
24. See Sunkel. «Transnational Capitalism and National Disinte­
gration in Latin America», in Social and Economic Studies. Voi. 22. 
No. I 1973.
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FIGURE III. Processes of Capitalist Dominance and Growth 
of Marginalisation Phenomena in Greece
A schematic structuralist analysis of Greece's transnational integra­
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(4) The marginalised, traditional sector: informal lagg­
ing sector and firms (agriculture, handicraft, per­
sonal services, small trade, unemployed, paupers).
For the case of Greece, the author has added another 
structural sector which should be placed between (3) 
and (4) above:
'5) The intermediate sector: informal lagging sector 
which absorbs a large share of the country’s 
economic activity in terms of GDP and employ­
ment. It consists mainly of semi-manufacturing, ar­
tisanal and family units in production, distribution 
and personal services. In terms of organisation and 
productivity rates it resembles more the traditional 
marginalised sector of the Greek economy than the 
formal, organised leading sector of the national 
modern private or public sector.
As will be demonstrated in greater detail in the next 
chapter, this latest phase of Western imperialism is link­
ed in Greece with a new phase of underdevelopment. 
This no longer reflects in a weak manufacturing sector, 
but is exemplified by the presence of a now 
technologically forward, dynamic and foreign control­
led manufacturing sector with vast State privileges,25 
which is not, however, organically articulated with the 
rest of the economy. Because of this insufficient ar­
ticulation between the different sections of the 
economy, the potentially beneficial growth effects of 
the dynamic (but foreign-controlled) sectors are not pro­
perly diffused over small-commodity agricultural and 
artisanal sectors, but to a large extent transferred 
abroad. Moreover, the penchant of Greek private 
capital for quick and easy profits has kept it in tourism, 
shipping, services and other comprador activities; only 
in a few instances has it entered industrial production, 
and then in the traditional branches of food, textiles 
etc.26
As discussed above, the peripheral character of the 
Greek social formation and economic structure pro­
duces acute inequalities of income distribution and life 
styles, which are reflected in a complex of activities, 
social groups and regions in the country, which con­
form to the developed part of the global system and are 
closely linked transnationally through many concrete 
interests, as well as by similar styles, ways and stan­
dards of living and by cultural affinities.27
These transnational^ linked social groups are made 
up of rentiers, entrepreneurs and technocrats originating
25. The main body of legislation consists of Law 2687/53 «on the 
investment and protection of foreign capital». Several other laws 
complete the framework, such as Emergency Law 89/67 «on the 
establishment in Greece of foreigh trading and manufacturing com­
panies», or Emergency Law 378/68 on re-shipping companies. There 
are yet other laws which offer incentives for regional (1078/71 and 
1312/72) or other development (4171/61 and 4458/65) which are used 
primarily by foreigh firms to increase their power.
26. See N. Mouzelis. in op. cit.
27. See Sunkel, Amin and Frank, in op. cit.
mostly from the classes of agricultural and merchant 
(comprador) capital, as well as from the ranks of the 
rural and urban petty bourgeoisie. The magnitude oi 
this high-income sector is a function, first, of the econo­
mic extent of its high-productivity activities; second, of 
its political ability to obtain a larger share of the inco­
mes generated by that sector; and third, of its capacity 
for extracting part of the surplus value generated at 
the competitively organised national modern and inter­
mediate level, as well as in the popular or low-income 
market, i.e. at the marginalised level—where the surplus 
value appropriated by the monopolistic and high- 
income sector comes from the low wages paid in the 
competitive and marginalised sectors.
Also demonstrated above were the mechanisms 
whereby the mass of the marginalised labour force not 
only contributes to capital accumulation by acting as 
an industrial reserve army, but also through its role of 
exploited consumer.28 Capital thus accumulated is 
transferred by these means from the marginal pole to 
the intermediate level, thence to the monopolistic level, 
and from there the bulk is transferred to the 
metropolitan centres where the dominant groups of this 
level are based.
The pattern of inequalities of income distribution in 
Greece have been assessed as follows: 40% of the lowest 
income groups receive 9.5% of the national disposable 
income, whereas the 17% of the top income brackets 
receive 58%.29
Greece’s peripheral character is further reflected in 
the cultural marginality of a national complement of ac­
tivities, social groups and regions partially or totally ex­
cluded from the developed part of the global system, 
and thus left without any substantial links with similar 
activities, groups and regions in other countries.
It has been maintained here that the above social 
structure derives a large part of its dynamism from the 
influence of the central countries on the internationalis­
ed or integrated sector, and that this influence makes 
itself felt:
—at the level of the productive structure, through the 
massive and extraordinary dynamic penetration of the 
transnational conglomerate and its subsidiaries and af­
filiates;
—at the technological level, by the large-scale introduc­
tion of highly capital-intensive techniques;
—at the cultural and ideological level, by the over­
whelming and systematic promotion and publicity of 
the super-consumption civilisation; and 
—at the concrete level of development-policies and 
strategies, by the pressure of national and international 
public and private interests in favour of the production
28. See Sunkel, «Inequality of Income Distribution and Life 
Styles», in op. cit.
29. See D. Karageorgas, «The Distribution of the Tax Burden by 
Income Groups in Greece», Economic Journal. June 1973.
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FIGURE IV. New International Division of Production and Labour 
Second Phase (1955-1975)
Age of neo-mercantilism Expansion of multinationals
Multinationals and Trade
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of higher-income consumption goods and services, and 
the process of transnational integration.
A schematic structural and spatial analysis of 
Greece’s transnational integration and national 
disintegration in the period between 1955 and 1975 is 
given below. Figure IV shows the model of peripheral 
capitalism and the appearance of multinationals in 
Greece at the time when a policy of the multinationals’ 
expansion was pursued by the Great powers, and 
especially by the United States. During that time, 
Greece’s economy became peripheral to the United 
States and Europe, and entered into trade relations with 
Japan.
The structural heterogeneity of the Greek economy 
overlaps with an equally heterogeneous class structure, 
so that internationally integrated and segregated groups 
appear among entrepreneurs, professionals, salary and 
wage earners, as well as a segment of the absolutely 
marginalised population.
Greece’s class structure appears in fact quite similar 
to Frank’s Latin American class structure along the 
lines of grande bourgeoisie, medium bourgeoisie, in­
dustrial proletariat, petty-bourgeois middle class, 
marginal or floating population, and rural structure (see 
Frank’s detailed analysis of Latin American class struc­
ture).
The tables at the end of this section show the social 
stratification of Greek society classified according to 
major groups of individual occupations and structural 
(institutional sectors).30
Tables I and II show that out of a total of 27,284 
Employers, Managers and Senior executives, only 
11.7% are employed in the foreign high-income sector. 
This is the privileged, highly-paid class of managers and 
executives employed by foreign enterprises installed in 
Greece, and closely integrated with the developed part 
of the global system. This class also includes grande 
bourgeois industrialists who have entered into joint 
ventures with foreign companies. According to Frank,
It is the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie that has been solidly 
integrated into the coalition between imperialism and the national 
comprador and bureaucratic bourgeois partners and executors.31
The largest percentage, however, of employers and 
senior executives are in the national modern sector 
(46.6%). They are the national grande bourgeoisie (i.e. 
the national industrialists and entrepreneurs), as well as 
the medium bourgeoisie (i.e. highly-paid managers, ex­
ecutives and consultants) who are employed in the cor­
30. For the methodology used in the compilation of these tables, 
see M. Evangelinides’ Ph. D. thesis submitted to Sussex University, 
Transnational Integration and National Disintegration: Regional 
Underdevelopment and Spatial Imbalance in Greek Society, (Ì979).
31. See Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution,
(Monthly Review Press, N.Y., 1970).
porate sector of the economy. The remainder (41.7%) 
are employed in the public sector, and are what Sunkel 
refers to as the organised middle-class executives and 
administrators of the more modern government ac­
tivities, who enjoy a relatively high remuneration com­
pared to the less organised bureaucrats in more tradi­
tional government activities.32
Out of a total of 208,833 Professionals and Techni­
cians, only 4.8% are employed in the foreign sector. 
This too is a privileged highly-paid middle-class group of 
well-trained and efficient professionals, who are closely 
integrated into the developed part of the global system.
One-third of Greece’s professionals and technicians 
(32%) are employed in the national modern sector. 
They are the middle class of the country’s social struc­
ture, and frequently rewarded with high incomes, social 
security coverage and fringe benefits—never, however, 
attaining the level of remuneration of the professionals 
in the foreign sector.
As contended above, there has been a gradual ab­
sorption of local national enterprise into the multina­
tional corporations or their disruption and displacement 
by foreign subsidiaries. Of cource, such replacement of 
the national modern sector by transnational technology 
and organisation permits the incorporation of some pro­
fessional and skilled manpower into the transnational 
sector, while displacing the rest—some into the in­
termediate sector, and the majority into the public sec­
tor.
The bulk of the professionals (56.5%) is employed in 
the public sector. Only a few of them, however, i.e. 
those employed in more modern government activities 
such as public corporations, are well trained and pro­
ductive and enjoy a relatively high remuneration. The 
mass of public-sector professionals are in the more tradi­
tional government activities; they are insufficiently 
trained (mainly as public administrators), unproductive 
and badly paid, and constitute the petty-bourgeois in­
tellectual proletariat par excellence.
The origins and causes of this supergrowth and over­
production of civil servants has been discussed already. 
The mechanisms which the Greek State developed and 
maintained during the 19th and early 20th centuries 
aimed at eradicating major unemployment and social 
pressures which had to be absorbed by the State, since 
the private sector could not take in the mass of 
unemployed. Since then the role of the State of super­
employer has continued and even accelerated.33
32. See Sunkel, «Transnational Capitalism and...», in op. cit.
33. See t. Tsoukalas, Dependence and Reproduction..., op. cit., 
where he argues that our higher educational institutions produce 
public administrators, accountant«, and bank clerks in lieu of social 
scientists. He attributes this phenomenon to the intermediary role 
(pieds noirs) of the Greek diaspora in Asia Minor, Egypt and the 
Balkans during the 18th, 19th. and early 20th centuries. The system 
keeps reproducing itself still, though the proper conditions for it have 
long ceased to exist.
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The intermediate formal sector absorbs only 6.7% of 
the professionals and technicians. These, together with 
the mass of civil servants, constitute the petty- 
bourgeois intellectual proletariat of the Greek social 
formation. They are badly trained and insufficiently 
paid, and it is their ambition to join the public and 
modern sectors of the economy.
Of the total of 249,808 Clerical workers (typists, 
cashiers, accountants, clerks, receptionists etc.), only 
7.7% are employed in the foreign sector. They general­
ly enjoy relatively good salaries, social security 
coverage, and fringe benefits, and are exposed to the 
methods and techniques of modern management and 
organisation imported into the country by the foreign 
subsidiaries. Their daily work, therefore, indirectly in 
corporates them into the developed part of the global 
system. They are considered to be the labour aristocracy 
of the urban petty bourgeoisie.
The segment of clerical workers employed in the na­
tional modern sector is 27%. They are badly trained 
and badly paid, and their ambition is to find a place in 
the foreign sector of the economy.
The majority of the clerical employees (54.5%) work 
in the public sector, and the remainder (10%) in the in­
termediate and traditional sectors. They are mostly of 
recent rural origin, and owe their social advancement to 
the clientelist networks which operate through an ex­
tended network of family relations. It is onlv via their 
relatives already established in Athens or other big ur­
ban centres (Thessaloniki, Patras etc.) that the young 
migrants decide to leave their villages or towns to come 
and work in the city. A 1964 statistical research study 
into migration movements to Athens found that 87% 
of the families resident in Athens had a relative migrant 
living with them.34
A number of sociological studies on this subject 
demonstrate clearly that in Greece the movement of 
rural migrants to the city is realised and channelled as 
part of the family institution. The move from the 
village to the city, and especially to Athens, and the 
migrant’s employment in the public sector, is con­
sidered as a social betterment for the family as a whole. 
Through this system, the migrant maintains his family 
environment and preserves his personal values and 
aspirations.35 He therefore remains politically and 
socially conservative, his only cultural change being a 
quick integration into urban consumption patterns. 
This phenomenon recalls Friedmann’s «ruralisation» of
34. See Migration to the Athens Region. Athens, 1964, p. 36, by 
the Greek National Statistics Service.
35. See D. Tsaoussis, «Social and Economic Aspects of Domestic
Migration», in Morphology of Greek Modern Society, Athens, 1971, 
where he analyses migratory movements within Greece in terms of
place of origin, sex, age and occupation of migrants, and explains 
their expectations, aspirations and processes of their move from a 
rural way of life in the village to a similar one in the city.
the city and «urbanisation without industrialisation» in 
peripheral social formations.36
Of the total 245,625 Tradesmen and Sales personnel, 
only 1.3% are employed in the foreign sector. They are 
very well trained and paid, and continuously exposed to 
the new methods and promotion techniques of market­
ing and salesmanship imported into the country by the 
subsidiaries of foreign companies. In consequence, tney 
are indirectly integrated into the developed part of the 
global system and, like their clerical worker counter­
parts, are considered the labour aristocracy of the ur­
ban petty bourgeoisie.
Only 3.2% of the tradesmen and sales personnel are 
employed in the national modern sector, and even 
fewer (0.4%) in the public sector. They are ill-trained 
and underpaid, and hope for employment in the foreign 
sector of the economy. They form part of the urban 
petty bourgeoisie, and are usually of rural origin.
The great majority of tradesmen are employed in the 
intermediate (9.5%) and traditional (85.6%) sector. 
They either work on their own account or unpaid in 
family firms, with unfavourable remuneration, working 
hours, organisation, and productivity rates, and poor 
access to financing or technologically developed means 
of production and distribution. They are constantly 
under strong pressure as they are exposed to the disrup­
tive effects of the wholesale introduction of new techno­
logical processes, goods and services, and new forms ol 
organisation and marketing. They belong to the marginalis­
ed sector of the economy, and are what Marx calls the 
«stagnant surplus population» which forms part of the 
active labour army with extremely irregular employ­
ment, characterised by maximum working hours and 
minimum wages. This group is mainly to be found in 
«domestic industry or commerce».37
A qualification is needed here with regard to 
tradesmen working on their own account. Athens has a 
number of shops (employing one to four people) selling 
very high-priced luxury consumer goods to the high- 
income sector of the population. These shops (bouti­
ques) are, of course, neither traditional nor marginal to 
the system, since they import most of their merchandise 
and maintain close contact with the developed part of 
the world system. Their activities are considered to be 
parasitic and speculative, because they contribute to an 
already pronounced inflationary trend. Furthermore, 
these trade enterprises are not productive, since they do 
not reinvest their super-profits in productive activities 
or capital equipment. Their proprietors merely further 
contribute to the balance-of-payments deficit, as well as 
to the outward-looking orientation of the economy, by 
buying themselves expensive imported cars, electronic
36. See Friedmann J. P., The Urban Transition, in op. cit.
37. See K. Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Produc­
tion, Vol. I (Lawrence and Wishart, 1974, pp. 600-602).
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and electric household equipment etc., and by investing 
in expensive flats and houses. In brief, they indulge in a 
way of life characterised by «demonstration effect».
The Governor of the Bank of Greece constantly de-, 
nounces these parasitic activities and super profits of 
the urban sector of the economy. He recently reported 
that in the last three years these small boutiques have 
tripled in number and contributed to price-inflation by 
overcharging for imported merchandise and fostering 
inflated demand for imported luxury goods.38
Of the total of 280,654 Service workers, only 2.2% 
are employed in the foreign sector. Like their counter­
parts the sales workers, they are well trained and paid, 
and exposed to modern methods and techniques of 
customer-oriented service. They work on cruise-ships, 
in big hotels, restaurants and other tourist enterprises 
operated by foreign companies in Greece.
Of these service workers,
—9.4% are employed in the national modern sector 
and, like the sales and clerical workers, hope to enter 
the foreign sector. They are part of the urban petty 
bourgeoisie.
—22.7% work in the public sector, to which they gain­
ed access thrçugh the usual networks of clientelistic 
relations operating via the channels of the family and 
village clan. Being of rural origin, they share the values 
and aspirations of the clerical personnel in the public 
sector.
—4.5% are employed in the intermediate sector, and 
—61.2%, the greatest part of them, in the traditional 
sector as waiters, cooks, janitors, domestic servants etc., 
crowded at the bottom of the social pyramid of the 
abundant Greek hotel, tourist, and entertainment 
businesses. Together with the tradespeople, they form 
part of Marx’s stagnant surplus population, employed 
in «domestic industry, commerce and entertainment 
service».
Of the total of 1,310,068 Farmers, none belong to 
the foreign sector, and only 4.8% come under the na­
tional modern sector. These are the big landowners 
who have more than 100 stremmata (25 acres) each to 
cultivate. The term «modern» is used here with certain 
qualifications as modern methods have not really yet 
been introduced into Greek agriculture.
The great mass of farmers belong to the intermediate 
sector (36.1%) and the traditional sector (59.1%). It is 
evident from Tables I and II that a substantial part of 
the economically active Greek population is still 
employed in the primary sector and, this, in turn, is 
chiefly part of the informal intermediate and traditional 
sectors. An important proportion of their number form 
what Marx calls the latent surplus population, which 
are constantly on the point of passing over into an ur­
38. X. Zolotas, «Speculation Keeps Inflation Rates at High
Levels», in To Vima, 3 Jan. 1979, Athens (in Greek).
ban petty bourgeoisie or manufacturing proletariat, and 
on the look-out for circumstances favourable to this 
transformation. But the constant flow towards the 
towns presupposes a constant latent surplus population 
in the countryside itself which ceaselessly develops and 
maintains and reinforces mechanisms for sending its 
children to the cities, to be absorbed either by the public 
sector, by the service sector or, to a minor extent, by 
the secondary sector.
A sociological study made in 1974 on the social 
stratification and education mobility in Greece shows 
that the children of farmers are more higher-education 
oriented, and a greater proportion of them enter higher 
educational institutions than children of working-class 
origin. Out of every 1,000 male higher-education can­
didates of rural origin (father’s occupation farmer), 140 
enter university, while per 1,000 of working class origin 
only 45 succeed in doing so.39
It has been pointed out repeatedly in this thesis that 
Greek society is still very open and social upward 
mobility still very strong. A comparative study between 
Greece and France has shown that, regardless of class, 
Greek children are more oriented towards higher 
education than French ones.
A French child of the upper class (father’s occupa­
tion professional or senior executive and administrator) 
has a 59% chance of entering university, while a Greek 
child of the same class (father’s occupation professional 
or senior executive) has an 89% chance. In the lower 
classes the difference is even more marked. A French 
child of rural or working-class origin has only a 1% 
chance of entering university, while the chance of a 
Greek child of rural origin is 14%, and of working-class 
origin 10%.40
. It becomes apparent therefore that in Greece, as in 
other developing peripheral countries (e.g. India), 
education is a highly appreciated channel for social 
mobility. It is not, however, appreciated as an end in 
itself, but merely as the means towards the benefits 
which an urban government or office job can bring to 
young rural migrants.41
Out of a total of 945,710 Craftsmen and Labourers, 
only 11.7% are employed in the foreign sector, 20.1% 
in the national modern sector, and 6.1% in the public 
sector. This industrial proletariat is made up of unionis­
ed industrial workers who, according to Frank and 
Sunkel, often receive wages which are high in relation 
to those of the bulk of the population, and social securi-
39. See I. Lambiri-Dimaki, «Social Stratification and Higher 
Education in Greece: Results of a Comparative Study», in Towards a 
Sociology of Education in Greece, National Centre of Social 
Research, Athens, 1974, pp. 118-139.
40. See I. Lambiri-Dimaki, Comparative Analysis of Higher 
Educational Opportunities between Social Classes in Greece and 
France, pp. 133-139.
41. Ibid., pp. 136-139.
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ty coverage hardly available to most others.42 They are 
often considered as the labour aristocracy of the work­
ing class. Of course, the wages and fringe benefits en­
joyed by the workers in the foreign sector are higher 
than wages in the national modern and public sectors, 
since wage levels in these latter are greatly effected by 
the pressure for jobs from the unemployed, the 
underemployed, and the very low-paid workers of the 
intermediate and primitive traditional sectors. Accord­
ing to Sunkel, the national modern sector is relatively 
stagnant, and the low wage level is probably a condition 
for the enterprises there to keep their relative com­
petitiveness.
The majority of craftsmen and labourers are 
employed in the informal sector—28.1% in the in­
termediate and 34.0% in the traditional sector. Here is 
Marx’s stagnant surplus population with extremely ir­
regular employment (maximum working hours, 
minimum wages), employed mainly in the so-called 
domestic industry, or recruited from those decaying 
branches of industry where handicraft is giving place to 
manufacture, and manufacture to machinery. Here we 
have a disguised form of unemployment, with han­
dicraft and small-scale industry organised and run by 
family units.43
In this group we also find what Marx calls the light 
infantry of capital or nomad labour, with agricultural
42. See Frank and Sunkel, in op. cit.
43. See Marx, in op. cit.
origins but largely industrial occupations. Nomad 
labour is used for operations such as building and con­
struction, drainage projects, brick-making, lime burn­
ing, laying railways etc. This migrant labour force 
follows major infrastructural projects from region to 
region as the contractors move on elsewhere.
There are 180,000 construction workers in the in­
termediate and traditional sector, and it is believed that 
a substantial number of them are «shoehorned off the 
ground» by infrastructural projects in the neighbour­
hood, and then drift to other projects near the cities.
As mentioned above, the Greek working class aspires 
less to improving its social status through education 
than do the Greek farmers. Working-class children 
have not the same ambitions of opportunities to acquire 
a higher education in order to start a white-collar office 
career, let alone become professionals. They prefer to 
become skilled workers and technicians, and their 
aspirations are oriented towards well-paid technical 
positions in the national modern and foreign sectors.
N OTE. We do not claim that the results of the social stratification 
of the economically active population by structural institutional sec­
tor give a perfect and quantitatively correct distribution of individual 
occupations and economic activities. Elowever, to the best of our 
knowledge, and taking into consideration the absence of statistical 
research material on the peripheral character of the Greek socia 
economic formation, this study is one of the first attempts to give a 
synthethised, qualitative and representative picture of the Greek peri­
pheral social formation. It is hoped that it will contribute to the rele­
vant literature, and serve as a basis and stimulus for further research 
and work in the field of development studies in Greece.
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TABLE II Economically Active Population, Classified by Major 
Groups of Individual Occupations in Each Institutional Sector.
Percentages
Institutional sectors
Groups of individual .2 § e
occupations OÛ'53 o 1 ■§ 1 Ί 1 1 2 o'-5 o 1
Li- & z: £ :% ο. V. £ V, H V. <
Employers Administrative
executive and managerial 
\\«>i kers 11.7 46.6 41.7 na na 100.0
Professional Technical and
relut-,' ' workers 4.8 32.0 56.5 6.7 na 100.0
Clerical and related workers 7.7 27.0 54.5 7.2 3.6 100.0
Tradesmen and sale·, workers 1.3 3.2 0.4 9.5 85.6 100.0
Service workers 2.2 9.4 22.7 4.5 61.2 100.0
Farmers-loggers and related 
workers na 4.8 na 36.1 59.1 100.0
Craf Ismen labourers and 
operators of transpt ’ t means 11.7 20.1 6.1 28.1 34.0 100.0
Total economically active 
population 4.7 13.3 11.9 24.6 45.5 100.0
Source: Table I. na = not applicable or negligible numbers
structural characteristics of underdevelopment 
and dependency typical of most formations 
of peripheral capitalism
Although considerable progress has been made, most 
of Greece’s labour is still employed in the primary and 
tertiary sector. 40.5% of the work force is employed in 
the primary sector,44 32% in the tertiary sector, and on 
ly 25.6% in manufacturing.
As shown in the National Accounts Statistics there 
were some positive structural changes in the country’s 
economy: in 1977, the secondary sector contributed 
32.98% to the Gross Domestic Product, compared to 
31.94% in 1972, and 26.34% in 1965, while the share 
of the primary sector dropped to 14.30% in 1977 from 
18.5% in 1972, 24.96% in 1965, and 31.00% in the 
years 1957-60. On the other hand, the service sector in 
the economy expanded and was contributing in 1977, 
52.72% to GDP as compared with 49.47% in 1972, 
48.69% in 1965 and 43% in the 1957-60 period.45
However, even though the country’s GDP tripled 
between 1957 and 1977 (with an annual growth rate of
44. The figure of 40% is much queried nowadays because it was 
based on the 1971 population census. Estimates for 1977 give figures 
ranging from 25-40% of the total labour force. However, since there 
has been no official national employment census since 1971, the 40% 
figure is quoted here.
45. For the 1957-60 period, see B. Ward, «Greece and Economic
Development», in Greek Regional Development, p. 11. For 1965-72 
period, Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1973 «Gross Domestic Pro­
duct and National Income: 1965-1972», p. 360. For 1977, Provi­
sional National Accounts of Greece, 1978, p. 86.
5.7% for the years 1950-1960, an increased annual 
growth rate of 7.2% for 1960-1970, and 5.5% for the 
period 1970-1978), there are still fundamental struc­
tural weaknesses in the country’s economy at both the 
national and regional level. They are typical of most 
formations of peripheral capitalism, and are discussed 
in some detail below.
A Large Informal Marginalised and Intermediate 
Sector, not Organically Linked with a Highly 
Dynamic Foreign-Controlled and 
National Modern Sector
Table V shows that 45.5% of the total ecomomically 
active population in 1974 worked in the traditional sec­
tor of the economy, contributing only 20.4% to the 
country’s GDP.46 In the intermediate sector, 24.6% of 
the economically active population contributed 23.7% 
to the GDP. Altogether, therefore, 70% of the 
country’s total labour force in the low-productive and 
informal lagging sectors of the economy—sometimes 
working as unpaid family members—contributed 44.1 % 
to the country’s GDP.
On the other hand, the 13.3% of the economically 
active population in the national modern sector in 1974 
produced 26.5% of the country’s GDP, while the even 
smaller 4.7% of the economically active population 
employed in the foreign sector produced and enjoyed 
12.1% of the country’s GDP. In other words, 18% of 
Greece’s economically active population employed in 
the formal modern leading and high-productivity sector 
produced 38.6% of the country’s GDP.
As for the public sector of the economy in 1974, 
there 12% of the labour force produced—or more ap­
propriately received—17.3% of the country’s GDP. As 
mentioned above, most of the public sector—with the 
exception of some cases in the branches of power, 
transportation, banking, telecommunications, shipbuild­
ing, petroleum refineries and the sugar industry—is a 
highly inefficient and bureaucratic machine which 
greatly hinders any effort for the country’s modernisa­
tion and socioeconomic development.
In no case, however, should these few exceptions or 
the instances of nationalisation of some companies/in­
dustries be considered a sign of positive and dynamic 
State intervention for the purpose of mobilising invest­
ment at times when private capital is hesitant to come 
forward, nor yet as an indication of any socialisation of 
the economy.
The cases of multi-industry State holding-companies 
like IRI and ENI in Italy, the British National Enter-
46. For the methodology used in defining and classifying each 
economic branch per institutional sector, see explanatory notes for 
Tables III, IV, VI Ph. D. Thesis, submitted to Sussex Univ., by Mary 
Evangelinides, 1979.
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TABLE III. Distribution of Employment and Distribution of Gross Domestic Product as Percentage of National Total 
by Main Economic Sector and by Institutional Sector, 1974
Formal organised sectors Informal Sectors All
Institutional
Foreign National modern Public Intermediate Traditional sectors
Main economic GDP EMPL GDP EMPL.. GDP EMPL GDP EMPL GDP EMPI GDP EMPL GDP EMPL
sectors % % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Primary 19.6 40.0 — _ 20.6 5.0 _ _ 53.0 36.0 26.4 59.0 100.0 100.0Secondary 31.0 26.0 30.4 15.0 26.9 20.0 5.1 3.0 24.4 26.0 13.2 36.0 100.0 100.0
Manufacturing 20.8 16.6 40.0 19.0 26.0 19.0 — — 17.0 15.0 17.0 47.0 100.0 100.0
Power mining- 39.4 46.0 5.4 15.0 100.0 100.0
construction 10.2 9.4 11.2 9.0 28.7 22.0 15.3 8.0 11.6 10.0 22.6 37.0 100.0 100.0
Tertiary 49.4 34.0 5.5 2.0 28.5 18.0 31.8 33.0 23.7 24.6 20.4 45.5 100.0 100.0
National total 100.0 100.0 12.1 4.7 26.5 13.3 17.3 11.9
Source: Tables IV and V.
TABLE IV. Distribution of the Gross Domestic Product by: a) Major Branches of Economic Activity, b) Institutional Sectors 
Year 1974










National modern Public Intermediate Traditional
1. Primary 100,595 N/A
Agriculture-
Live-stock % % % %
Forestry 20.723 20.6 N/A 53,315 53.0 26,557 26.0
and Fishing
11. Secondary 158,901 48,379 30.4 42.718 26.9 8,071 5.1 38,805 24.4 20,928 13.2
—Manufacturing 106,153 42,461 40.0 27,600 26.0 N/A 18,046 17.0 18,046 17.0
— Mining-Quarring 6,739 607 9.0 4,495 66.7 N/A 1,031 15.3 606 9.0
— Power-Gas-Wa-
ter 8,071 N/A N/A 8,071 100.0 N/A N/A
—Construction 37,938 5,311 14.0 10.623 28.0 N/A 19,728 52.0 2,276 6.0
III. Tertiary 252,717 13,789.3 5.5 72.102.5 28.5 80,375 31.8 29,274.2 11.6 57,176 22.6
—Transportation, 35,072 1.052 3.0 9,820 28.0 14,029 40.0 8,768 25.0 1,403 4.0
Telecomunica-
tion
—W & R Trade 72.709 8,725 12.0 29,084 40.0 N/A 7,271 10.0 27,629 38.0
— Banking 11,002 1,870 17.0 N/A 9,132 83.0 N/A N/A
—Insurance 1,446 564 39.0 882 61.0 N/A N/A N/A
— Real Estate 469 0.3 0.06 290.5 61.94 N/A 178.2 38.0 N/A
— Dwellings 33,888 N/A 8,472 25.0 N/A 8,472 25.0 16,944 50.0
—Admin. Defence 43,600 N/A N/A 43,600 100.0 N/A N/A
—Education 13.998 N/A 4,059 29.0 9,939 71.0 N/A N/A
—City health 8,963 N/A 5,288 59.0 3,675 41.0 N/A N/A
Services
—Hotels, 15,028 751 5,0 6,763 45.0 N/A 2,104 14.0 5,410 36.0
Restaurants and
the like
—Other Services 16,542 827 5.0 7,444 45.0 N/A 2,481 15.0 5,790 35.0
(Personal-Social
offices etc.)
Total 512,213 62.168.3 12.1 35,543.5 26.5 88,446 17.3 121,394.2 23.7 104,661 20.0
Own elaboration
See infra for methodology and statistical sources used for the compilation of above Table and Table V. 
* Horizontal percentage allocation.
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of economic active Foreign National modern Public Intermediate Traditional
activity population











—Manufacturing 543,814 102,918 19.0 102,918





256,000 25,000 9.8 53,000
III. Tertiary 1,105,016 22,520 2.0 199,203
—Transportation
Telecomuni-
cation 250,000 7,000 2.8 80,000
—W & R Trade 279,725 8,200 2.9 28,200
—Banking 27,260 1,360 5.0
2,540—Insurance 4,230 1,690 40.0
















and the like 
—Other Services 132,000 2,260 1.7 20.343
(Personal-Social 
Offices, etc.)
Total 3,267,982 152,238 4.7 434,172
* Horizontal percentage allocation.
prise Board, and French Planning Agreements (Con­
trais de Programme) have no parallel in Greece.
NOTE. Again, as in our note on p. 134 above, we do not claim tha-t 
the results of our classification of the Greek economy by structural 
institutional sector give a perfectly and quantitatively correct 
distribution of employment and Gross Domestic Product in each in­
stitutional sector. Nevertheless, we hope that as an early study in this 
field it will help fill a gap and stimulate studies and research.
A Low-Productivity Agricultural Sector,
Dominated from within by a Large 
Marginalised Sector
Though Greek agriculture produces less than one- 
fifth of the domestic product, 40% of the active popula­
tion was still employed in the primary sector in 1971. 
The vast majority of the just over a million Greek 
farms are less than 12.5 acres (50 stremmata), and not
5.0 472,428 36.0 775,125 59.0
19.9 25,900 3.0 221,763 26.1 303,063 35.7
19.0 82,220 15.0 255,758 47.0
55.5
25,900 100.0
4,543 19.0 43,05 18.0
20.7 135,000 52.7 43,000 16.8
18.0 362,375 32.8 111,824 10.1 409,094 37.1
32.0 93,000 37.2 52,000 20.8 18,000 7.2
10.1
25,900 95.0







15.4 13,300 11.4 83,656 71.5
15.4 17,284 13.1 92,113 69.8
13.3 388,275 11.9 806,015 24.6 1,487,282 45.5
much of the agricultural population is without any land 
at all. Most of the soil is not very fertile, and basic crop 
yields are low by West European standards. The 
fragmentation of the farms47 further inhibits productivi­
ty, and although there is a government programme for 
the consolidation of these small units, very little of this 
has actually been done.
Furthermore, many agronomists believe that there is 
substantial underemployment in agriculture (Marx’s la­
tent surplus population), affecting from between 
200,000 to 600,000 people.48 Some conflicting evidence 
was, however, presented (by Papandreou, Pepelassis,
47. Cf. John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, Modern Greece, 
Ernest Benn, London, 1968, p. 329; also K. Thompson, Farm 
Fragmentation in Greece, Athens, 1962; and B. Ward, Greek 
Regional Development, pp. 17-19.
48. See Marx in op. cit. and «Supply and Demand for Labour per 
Occupational Class», Development Plan 1976-1980, KEPE, Athens, 
p. 34.
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Yannopoulos, Campbell)49 as well as by the Association 
of Greek Industrialists,50 contending that there are 
acute seasonal labour shortages in the agricultural 
areas, due to mass emigration to the towns and abroad.
Table III showed that in 1974 the primary sector was 
still employing 40% of the country’s labour force 
(1,313,336 people), who contributed 19.6% to the 
country’s GDP.
Table III also showed that 59% of the farmers work 
in the traditional sector and contribute only 26.4% to 
the primary sector’s GDP; furthermore, the 36% of 
them who work in the intermediate sector produce 
53% of the primary sector’s GDP. Thus, 95% of the 
farmers worked in low-productivity and rather tradi­
tional methods of farming and/or as unpaid family 
members, contributing 79.4% to the primary sector’s 
GDP in 1974. On the other hand, a small proportion 
(5%) of Greek farmers used more modern and 
mechanised farming methods, and managed to con­
tribute 20.6% to the sector’s GDP.
Generally speaking, the structure and organisation of 
the primary sector is outdated and insufficiently mechanis­
ed. It is subject as much to considerations of a family’s 
subsistence needs and labour resources as to simple 
commercial interests and responses. Agriculture neither 
answers existing market demand effectively, nor does it 
realise its production potential. Agricultural exports 
lack reasonable certainty and are not varied enough. In 
addition, the policy of price supports for wheat—original­
ly instituted for mainly political reasons—has prevented 
the proper development of valuable labour-intensive ex­
port crops such as especially cotton, fruits and vegetables.51
Official statistics show that there has been a marked 
reduction in the increase-rate of agricultural output and 
income between 1970 and 1977, as shown in Table VI. 
Moreover, the target increase-rate of 5.2% set in the 
1968-1972 programme was too high: triple the actual 
rate achieved. Despite mass emigration from the rural 
areas, the rate of increase in the per-capita income from
49. A. Papandreou, A Strategy for Creek Economic Development, 
Centre of Economic Research, Athens, 1962, indicates that Greece 
could expect to face a labour shortage by 1970. Cf. also A. Pepelassis, 
Surplus Labour in Greek Agriculture 1953 1960, Centre of Economic 
Research, Athens, 1962; George Yannopoulos, «Workers and 
Peasants», in Greece under Military Rule, Seeker and Warburg, Lon­
don, 1972, p. 121; and J. Campbell and P. Sherrard, Modern Greece, 
op. cit. p. 324.
50. Assoc, of Greek Industrialists, «Employment in Agriculture», 
in Labour Market and Wage Structure in Greek Industry, Athens, 
1974, pp. 76-77.
51. The failure of agriculture to realise its production potentiaf is
discussed by John Campbell and Phillip Sherrard in Modern Greece,
op. cit., p. 332. C. Campbell also reports that for a number of years 
since the war the government has guaranteed a minimum price for 
wheat. Cf. also Assoc, of Greek Industrialists, «Employment in Low 
productivity Sectors», in op. cit., p. 74 and c, where the low produc­
tivity of agriculture and the structural problems in this sector are 
discussed.
TABLE VI. Averuge Annual Growth Rate in Agricultural 
and Non-agricultural Products at constant prices
Agricultural GDP Non-agriculturai GDP Total GDP
1950-1960 18% <L4% 5?7%
1960-1970 4.6% 7.8% 7.2% '
1970-1977 1.7% 6.0% 5.3%
Source: Direct communication from the Ministry of Coordination,
National Accounts of Greece.
agriculture has not significantly gone up since 1970.
Pesmazoglou claims that changes in per-capita in­
come are difinitely affected by type and size of crops 
and the varying rates of emigration, with the per-capita 
income from traditional crops such as tobacco, olives, 
currants, sultanas and wheat being probably stagnant 
or increasing only very slowly.52 The dominant crops of 
Greek agriculture are wheat, tobacco and olives; the 
main exports are of tobacco, currants, sultanas, fruits 
and cotton.
A Highly Inflated and Parasitic Service Sector
It was shown in Table 111 above that already by 1974 
the tertiary sector of the economy had reached percent­
ages of GDP and employment resembling those of what 
Rostow has called post-industrial societies.53
In that year, 34% of the country’s labour force 
(1,105,016 people) were employed in the tertiary sector 
and contributed to, or rather disposed of, 50% of the 
country’s GDP. Table IV shows in terms of GDP and 
employment the large share in the country’s economic 
structure of the branches of transport, trade, tourism, 
personal and social services, public administration, 
banking and financing.
According to Table III, almost half of the labour 
force in the tertiary sector (47% or 520,918 people) 
were employed in the informal traditional and in­
termediate sectors, working in low-productive, 
parasitic, backward conditions and/or as unpaid family 
members. They account for 34% of the tertiary sector’s 
GDP. The public sector employed 33% of the tertiary 
sector’s labour force (362,375 people), and accounted 
for 32% of the tertiary sector’s GDP.
The remaining 20% of the tertiary sector’s labour 
force was employed in the formal sectors: the national 
modern (18% or 199,203 people) and the foreign sector 
(2% or 22,520 people). Between them, they contributed 
34% to the tertiary sector’s GDP (national modern 
29%, foreign 5%).
Both sectors, but especially the privileged 2% of the
52. Cf John Pesmazoglou, «Slowdown in Agriculture: the Greek 
Economy», in Greece under Military Rule, op. cit.
53. See W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non­
communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press. 1960
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foreign sector, controlled modern dynamic branches 
such as banking, financing, tourism and hotel 
businesses, distribution of petroleum products and elec­
trical domestic equipment, office management and con­
sulting services. This situation is quite typical, and the 
foreign-controlled sector, according to Sunkel, 
is actually a foreign «enclave» aimed at the local market, characteris­
ed by highly efficient and rational management and organisation pro­
cedure, enormous capacity to manipulate consumer and consump­
tion patterns through the utilisation of the mass media, marketing 
and financial techniques and product-design innovations and dif­
ferentiation.54
An Industrial Sector with Key Dynamic 
Industries Controlled by Foreign Capital,
Leaving the Traditional Branches to 
Domestic Capital and Control
Another weakness of the Greek economy is that, 
although in the period 1957-1977 the country’s GDP 
tripled, per-capita income increased, and the country 
enjoyed a certain degree of affluence, its industrial sec­
tor is still characterised by small family enterprises 
operating at high costs and with obsolete machinery. 
Until recently it has been protected by tariffs and severe 
import controls blocking foreign competition.
Furthermore, the little share of manufacturing, min­
ing and energy for the period 1951-1977 is reflected in 
the national gross domestic asset formation.55
Another structural weakness in Greek industry is 
that it is mainly dominated by traditional industries 
such as food and textile industries. This pattern of 
dominance by textile and food industries combined 
with a relatively small contribution to GDP by 
manufacturing, taken as a whole, is typical of develop­
ing countries. In the case of textiles, classification is 
somewhat arbitrary since textiles could be a highly 
dynamic sector in modern manufacturing as it allows 
the transformation of natural fibre into compound 
natural and synthetic fibre products through the use of 
modern production techniques.56 However, in the 
Greek case textiles will be considered to be «tradi­
tional» manufacturing.
The dominant Greek industry is indeed textiles, with 
over 25% of value added in total manufacturing in 
1961 and 15 % in 1971. There follows the food industry 
with 16% of value added in total manufacturing in 
1961 and 11.6% in 1971. The remaining branches con­
tribute to the value added in total manufacturing but to 
a lesser extent.57
54. See O. Sunkel, Background Paper on the Workshop on the 
European Periphery, IDS, 1977.
55. National Accounts of Greece, 1958-1975 and 1977.
56. In the Italian case, Holland classifies textiles under modern 
manufacture.
57. Percentages calculated from Statistical Yearbook 1973, pp.
Thus, the decade of the 1960s saw some improve­
ment in the country’s industrial structure, and some 
shift towards the dynamic modern industries of 
metallurgy, electrical machinery, transport equipment, 
paper and printing, rubber and plastics. However, the 
leading industries remained those of food and textiles. 
As for the new dynamic industries’ increased share in 
the country’s total manufacturing, this was due mainly 
to foreign investement.
Table III showed that 40% of the manufacturing 
GDP was generated by 19% of the industrial labour 
force working in foreign firms. These firms, together 
with the national modern firms which invest mainly in 
textiles, tobacco and agro-industries, control the 
market—i.e. 38% of the industrial labour force produc­
ed 66% of the manufacturing GDP in 1974.
A study by P. Roumeliotis found that most of the 
foreign investment goes into those branches of Greek 
manufacturing which accounted for 52% of the total 
manufacturing assets in 1975: chemicals, non-metallic 
minerals, transport equipment, basic metals, metal 
products, petroleum, paper and rubber and plastics.
Looking at the first ten enterprises in terms of sales of 
each of the above branches shows that there is a rela­
tionship between concentration and foreign invest­
ment. The percentage range of foreign participation in 
the total assets of the ten largest enterprises in each of 
the eight key branches in 1975 was as follows:
% of % of the 10 Total assets
Foreign out largest in in each 
sector of enterprises key branch
Basic metals 92 99 100
Paper 96 99 100




minerals 15 70 100
Metal products 12 52 100
Plastics 21 50 100
Source: Roumeliotis, Multinationals and Overpricing-Underpricing in Greece, 
Papazissis, Athens, 1978, p. 136.
Table III showed no participation of the public sector 
in manufacturing after 1974. Nevertheless, there have 
been a few cases since then of State take-overs (na­
tionalisations) of concerns which were part of large 
companies owned by Greek cosmopolitan capital. 
These were the Elefsis shipyards and some agro­
industries of the Andreadis Group of Companies, as 
well as the Petroleum refineries at Aspropyrgos of the 
Niarchos Group. The sugar industry is also a State 
monopoly.
200-201. For 1961 value added weights see Ward, «Greece...» in 
op.cit. p. 13.
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The rest of manufacturing (intermediate and tradi­
tional sectors) absorbs the majority of artisans and 
workers. Of the manufacturing labour force, 62% 
works in medium and smallscale industry, and con­
tributes 34% to the manufacturing sector’s GDP.
Acute and Persistent Tendency to 
Foreign Indebtedness
Yet another structural characteristic of under­
development and dependency is the current growing 
external deficit of the Greek economy. This is due to 
greatly inflated public and private consumption and 
housebuilding, while productive investments and ex-; 
ports lack buoyancy.
This corroborates Sunkel’s, Amin’s and Frank’s argu­
ments that in peripheral countries acute and persistent 
tendencies to foreign indebtedness result in growing 
fiscal deficits due to the highly inflated role of the 
public sector, and to the need for foreign financing 
leading to ever greater dependency. This is further ag­
gravated by the importation of luxury consumer goods 
for groups with rising incomes and a high marginal pro­
pensity for purchasing such goods and indulging in 
«demonstration effect» behaviour. In addition, exports 
and out-flow of foreign capital in the form of profits, 
price-transfers, royalties etc. aggravate the balance of 
payments deficit still more.
The balance of payments figures show that the cur­
rent external account in 1977 developed less favourably 
than the authorities had hoped. Reflecting buoyant 
domestic demand, volume imports surged appreciably 
while exports were sluggish; together with price 
movements, this resulted in a substantial increase in the 
trade deficit from $3.3 billion in 1976, to $3.9 billion in 
1977. As usual in modern Greek economic history, part 
of this deterioration was offset by a strong rise in invisi­
ble receipts (shipping and workers’ remittances as well 
as tourism), so that the current external deficit actually 
broadened by only $0.2 billion to $ 1.3 billion (4.75% of 
the GDP). Also, to increase official reserves, the 
authorities resorted to external borrowing.
According to a 1978 OECD report on Greece, all the 
major categories of exports seem to have fallen in real
terms. Export performance was particularly poor to the 
United States market which accounts for about 5% of 
total exports, while exports to the EEC (50% of total 
exports) changed little in volume. It also appears that 
Greece did not repeat its good performance of the 
previous three years in the Middle East oil-producing 
countries, and the value of exports there slowed down 
markedly in 1977, suggesting almost stagnation in 
terms of volume. On the other hand, there was a pro­
nounced acceleration in consumer-goods imports, large­
ly concentrated on durables including motor vehicles. 
Imports of private motor cars were 70% above the 
1976 level and accounted for about eight percentage 
points of the 24% increase in industrial consumer im­
ports. Imports of household equipment also increased 
sharply by 50% in terms of value. The moderate import 
increase in capital goods lay mainly in transport equip­
ment, and the volume of machinery and electrical 
equipment imports remained broadly stable, if not stag­
nant.
As mentioned already, part of this deterioration was 
offset by a steep rise in invisible receipts, due largely to 
higher shipping receipts and emigrant remittances than 
in 1976. The latter were due mostly to improved 
employment and higher pay in the United States and 
Germany, and the increased value of the Deutschemark 
in capital inflows for real-estate purchases, and a similar 
movement in long-term entrepreneurial capital, mainly 
in oil-refining and oil-distribution activities and in 
mining.58
All the above so-called invisible receipts help to 
balance the growing payments deficit. At the same time 
they deprive the country of its most dynamic and pro­
ductive human resources. They contribute to a national 
socio-economic structure characterised by the combin­
ed phenomena of underdevelopment typical of most 
formations of peripheral capitalism, together with 
specific parasitic comprador activities. This outward 
orientation of Greek capital and human resources is a 
pronounced feature of the Greek nation and people, 
who have always exhibited acute socio-psychological 
symptoms of the «permanent migrant» syndrome.
58. See OECD Economic Survey: Greece 1978, «Foreign Trade 
and Balance of Payments», paras. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22.
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